The World Development Movement welcomes this opportunity to submit evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee. WDM is a democratic membership organisation with around 25,000 supporters and 100 local groups across the UK. WDM is an independent organisation, without any institutional or political affiliation. WDM's aim is to improve the policies of companies, governments and international agencies towards the world's poor. Established in 1970, WDM has extensive experience in research, public education, advocacy and providing policy advice to politicians, civil servants and company executives.

  Since 1996, WDM's main advocacy programme, People before Profits, has aimed to improve the practices of multinational companies towards workers, local people and the environment in the poorest countries. In response to the concerns of partner organisations in developing countries, WDM has undertaken research and policy analysis into the likely impact of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) on the environment and livelihoods of the poor in developing countries, particularly on farmers.

  The conclusion is that new GMO technologies have some potential to help the poor, but contain very serious risks that, if not controlled, could result in severe environmental risks and the further marginalisation and impoverishment of millions of farmers. WDM's analysis also concludes that voluntary agreements with multinational companies are neither equitable nor feasible. WDM considers there is no substitute for coordinated action by governments at an international level to ensure that sound regulations are established for the trade and release of GMOs. The focus of this submission is therefore on the need for global rules to ensure that GMOs are to the benefit of the world's poor rather than their detriment.

  This submission calls for British government leadership in agreeing such global rules. WDM is calling for urgent action by the government to re-convene negotiations in order to achieve a strong Biosafety Protocol at the earliest opportunity.

THE LIKELY IMPACT OF GMOS ON THE POOR

  The major multinationals promoting GMOs are increasingly using the argument that "genetic engineering is key to feeding the world's increasing numbers of people" and "slowing the acceptance of biotechnology is a luxury our hungry world cannot afford." (both from Monsanto advertisements). WDM considers that these arguments are not founded in reality. A closer analysis of the evidence suggests that, far from feed the hungry, the unrestricted introduction of GMOs may result in further hardship for the world's poor.

  The argument relies on a simplistic assumption that there are hungry people because there is not enough food in the world. However, as the World Food Programme has pointed out, the world's farmers do produce more than enough food. Yet over 800 million people go hungry.

  The real problem is that the poor do not have the land, seeds and tools to grow crops, or cannot afford to buy food. It is the unjust political and economic structures at the local, national and international levels, in combination with mounting ecological damage, that marginalise the poor from food production or deny them an opportunity to buy food. As stated by Ethiopia's representative to the Biosafety Protocol negotiations, Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher, "There are still hungry people in Ethiopia, but they are hungry because they have no money, no longer because there is no food to buy . . . We strongly resent the abuse of our poverty to sway the interests of the European public".

  In some cases, GM seeds may play a valuable role in conferring resistance to particular diseases or in adapting to specific climatic conditions. These seeds may benefit some farmers. But it is misleading to claim that GMOs will solve the problems of world hunger. The companies producing GMOs for profit will do nothing to redress the real causes of food poverty. In addition:

—  few of the GM crops being produced or researched are foods that the poor can afford—most GM crops commercially grown are for animal feed (maize and soya beans). Some other crops are likely to substitute laboratory production for crops exported from developing countries (such as fructose produced by genetic engineering replacing sugar);

—  the use of chemical pesticides in conjunction with GM seeds will mean that farmers and local people will be unable harvest the plants, medicines and edible herbs that co-exist with crops that are currently grown with low chemical inputs;

—  much of the promise of improved economics for farmers in the industrialised countries derives from lower labour use through the use of targeted chemicals rather than increased crop yields—experience to date suggests that yields for many GM crops are no higher than those of natural varieties;

—  the high cost of seed and chemical inputs to produce genetically modified crops is likely to be unavailable to poor farmers that do not have access to affordable credit, especially women farmers, and will concentrate farming in larger, industrial agricultural units;

—  if small farmers do buy GM seeds, they will need to take on debt, often at high interest rates, in order to do so. This is likely to make them increasing dependent on money-lenders and large multinational seed providers. The Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology in India has documented hundreds of suicides in 1998 by farmers in India as a result of poorly performing hybrid seeds;

—  most GM seeds are intended for one planting only - this means a dramatic change in the practices and costs for an estimated 80 per cent of the world's farmers that use seed that is saved and exchanged;

—  replacing the diverse varieties of saved and exchanged seeds with a few dominant mono-crops increases the risk of famine from widespread crop failure due to pests or adverse climatic conditions. For example, over 50,000 varieties of plants are currently grown in India, with surveys revealing over 70 varieties in one village alone. The genes that these plants contain provide insurance against drought or the devastating affects that diseases can cause in mono-culture crops.

  Therefore, the claims by multinational companies that GM seeds are the answer to world hunger are unjustified. At best, they are cynical and self-serving public relations statements. Rather, it is likely that the introduction of GMOs could create severe hardship for the world's poorest people who are concentrated in rural communities.

THE CASE OF TERMINATOR TECHNOLOGY

  In May 1998, Monsanto purchased the US company Delta & Pine Land Company which, along with the US Department for Agriculture, had developed and patented a new method of ensuring that farmers would not re-use seed. The "Technology Protection System" (dubbed Terminator Technology) was followed in August 1998 by Zeneca's version and subsequently by a range of other approaches. The Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), a Canadian NGO, announced earlier this year that it had discovered three dozen new patents that can be used for the genetic sterilisation of plants and seeds.

  These technologies, put simply, genetically alter seeds, rendering them sterile. Plants grown from terminator seed produce seed, but that seed is sterile and will not germinate when planted. Farmers are therefore prevented from saving and exchanging seed or breeding new crop varieties to increase their seed diversity. Most importantly from the company's perspective, they are forced to purchase seed from commercial companies each season.

  Terminator seeds would undermine the traditional practices of saving and exchanging seeds, thereby contributing to the maintenance of a diversity of seed varieties. RAFI estimates that this would affect 1.4 billion farmers—mainly poor farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America—who save and exchange seed.

  Further, terminator technology creates the risk of transgenic pollution, resulting in sterile natural crops in neighbouring fields. There are, as yet no crops currently available with terminator technology, but Monsanto has applied for patents in over 70 countries and Zeneca in 58 countries.

  There is no defensible reason for the introduction of terminator technology other than for the benefit of companies producing seed. From the perspective of these companies, terminator technology is a failsafe way of enforcing their patents. However, these companies will bear few of the ultimate risks of the technology, which will be externalised onto farmers, rural communities and the environment. The nature of these risks has been indicated by cases of unauthorised releases of GMOs into the environment (including in the UK where there is a strong regulatory regime compared to many developing countries) and evidence of transgenic contamination.

  As a result, a growing number of scientists and experts in developing countries have become alarmed at the development of these new technologies. The world's largest agricultural research network, the Consultative Groups on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) have banned terminator technologies from their crop breeding programmes. Yet, despite these social and environmental concerns, the major life science multinationals are close to introducing the first terminator seeds and there is no regulatory framework that will prevent them from introducing them on a massive scale.

THE NEED FOR GLOBAL RULES

  In parallel to the fears and anger of consumers and environmentalists in the UK, there are growing anti-GMO movements in other countries. The "No to GMO" campaign in India is promoting the saving of indigenous seeds and the widespread introduction of ecologically sound agricultural systems as an alternative to a GMO crop future. It is a movement that is rapidly gaining in strength and prompting comparisons with the Gandhian movement to resist imported technology and promote hand-spun cloth.

  But there is a crucial difference between the UK and developing countries. While the British government has been able to exercise its power and influence with multinationals to persuade them to voluntarily agree to a moratorium, few developing countries can do likewise. Attempts to block the import or release of GMOs are likely to be met with challenges under the World Trade Organisation, on the grounds that such restrictions constitute a restraint of trade. The efforts by civil society in the UK to block GMOs will, if anything, increase the targeting of developing countries by multinationals.

  Multinationals argue that farmers and consumers can make up their own minds as to whether to choose GMOs. But the need for a moratorium in the UK demonstrates that the existing safeguards are not sufficient even in the more advanced industrialised countries. Far fewer such safeguards exist in developing countries. Some crucial differences are as follows:

—  there is insufficient objective research available to farmers in developing countries to be able to make informed choices. The poorer countries have little funding for public research and most research on crop performance under local ecological conditions is undertaken by the companies that are selling the seeds. There is rarely any consideration of the likely social impacts;

—  there is usually no legal recourse for the farmers if the seeds do not perform to their potential. Farmers in the USA have sued Monsanto over seeds that do not meet the claimed yields, but such liability is impossible to enforce in many developing countries. These are the conditions that have led to large numbers of suicides amongst farmers in India when they incurred debt to buy hybrid seeds which failed to produce to the advertised standards;

—  there is no legal recourse for third parties (such as neighbouring farmers) to seek compensation for damage that may arise from transgenic effects;

—  local seed monopolies are common, exacerbated by the vertical integration of the life sciences industry and recent mergers and acquisitions of seed distributors and retailers. Currently just ten multinationals have around 40 per cent of the world seed market and further acquisitions are likely. In Argentina, Monsanto already controls over half of the maize seed market. With little ability to travel to other regions to buy seeds, most developing country farmers face little choice other than to buy seed from their local outlet. This creates an effective monopoly in the retailing of seed, which is largely unregulated by national governments and increasingly controlled by seed producers. Therefore, many farmers will have little choice other than to buy GM seed;

—  the dominant multinational life science companies such as Monsanto and Zeneca have annual revenues far larger than the GNP of many developing countries and have a powerful influence over ministries of agricultural research and extension services that provide advice to farmers. The powerful lobbying techniques employed by companies like Monsanto have recently been exposed in the UK and the EU. There is far less transparency and public scrutiny in most developing countries. It is likely that the advice given to farmers by government agencies will often be less than fully independent;

—  the powerful influence that the life sciences multinationals exert over governments is also likely to affect the regulatory process governing the release of new varieties of seeds (for those countries that have such a process). The potential for "regulatory capture" has been vividly demonstrated in the case of BSE in the UK—it is a very real danger in many developing countries. Further, the protocols for testing GMOs are complex, even for the industrialised countries, and there is often far less information available on the ecological conditions that may create adverse impacts from GMOs release;

—  few developing countries have well developed laws and standards to prevent coercive marketing and misleading advertising by companies (in the UK, Monsanto was cited for misleading advertising by the Advertising Standards Authority)

  For these reasons WDM considers that farmers in developing countries will be denied the opportunity to make informed choices on seed purchase. Companies themselves are unlikely to take on these responsibilities. As Phil Angell, Monsanto's Director of Corporate Communications says "Monsanto should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech food. Our interest is in selling as much of it as possible. Assuring its safety is the FDA's job". As this quote points out, it is usually the role of national governments to regulate new technologies such as GMOs. This should include the ability to restrict the import and release of GMOs. For example, the Commissioner for Agriculture Research in India has vowed to stop the import of terminator seeds.

  However, such restrictions are increasingly constrained by international trade rules. The challenge by the US against EU restrictions on products from cattle treated with bovine growth hormone demonstrates the degree to which free trade is likely to take precedence over risks to public health. This is particularly true in the case of new technologies where there is little existing scientific evidence of past damage. Further, the risks associated with the import of GMOs into developing countries includes a complex mix of potential environmental damage, social damage and health problems. Any such restrictions to GMOs would be challenged by the major trading nations producing GM seeds and GM products, most notably the USA.

  Therefore, there is no realistic possibility that voluntary action by industry or unilateral action by national governments will be able to prevent unacceptable risks being loaded onto the environment and vulnerable people in developing countries. WDM has concluded that international regulation is urgently required in order to provide the opportunity for adequate scrutiny of imports and releases into the environment of GMOs.

THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL

  The best opportunity to achieve such regulation (indeed, the only existing international process) is the Biosafety Protocol, an agreement being negotiated under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. At the time the Convention on Biological Diversity was signed, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, nations also agreed to hold further discussion on the threat that genetic manipulation may pose for biological diversity. Nations agreed to work toward a protocol that would establish procedures for the safe trade and release of biotechnology products. Negotiations amongst 170 countries have been held over the past four years, with the aim of concluding an agreement at the Sixth Meeting of Negotiators in Cartegena, Colombia in February 1999.

  The negotiations fell apart without agreement in February after disruptive tactics employed by the USA and a small group of grain exporting countries. The irony was that the US does not have official standing in the talks because it has refused to ratify the Biodiversity Convention. However, their delegation, which included a strong group of representatives of the GM industry, was able to prevent an agreement being signed.

  Negotiations could be characterised by the developing countries seeking a strong protocol that would ensure they (and industrialised countries) had the right to refuse the import and release of GM seeds, food and animal feed that failed to pass an assessment of social and environmental risk. Developing countries also pressed for a system of liability to ensure that, if there was damage from GMOs, the companies producing the GMOs would be liable. This was seen as vital in order to "internalise" the risks (as well as the potential profits) into company decision-making of research, product development and marketing.

  The US and the so-called Miami group argued for a narrow definition of GMOs and no liability provisions, and proposed that a clause should be inserted to give priority to World Trade Organisation rules over the Biosafety Protocol. Such a clause would have meant that any country restricting imports would have risked a challenge under WTO provisions on restraint of trade.

  The position of the EU was crucial. There was some initial support for the concept of liability, including the majority view from an expert working group convened by the UK in July 1998. However, as the negotiations proceeded, the EU's support for the inclusion of liability provisions weakened. Similarly, the EU angered most developing countries when it appeared to follow the most of the US proposals to weaken the Protocol. This change in the EU's position was the key turning point that resulted in the breakdown of negotiations.

  There are differing interpretations of the UK's role. The image that negotiators portrayed was that of an honest broker, trying to bring the US into the agreement, even if that meant the Protocol was weakened. But other reports painted a picture of the UK acting fully in concert with the US. The Guardian article on 4 February 1999 exposed that "Britain and the United States have decided to block attempts to ban genetically modified organisms by India and other developing countries who want to protect their traditional farming methods and the food supply of the poor".

  Throughout the negotiations, the UK was also characterised by NGOs as one of the main supporters of the biotechnology industry, promoting the interests of its multinationals abroad, despite the depth of British public opinion in favour of strong regulation and the negotiation of voluntary agreements with industry. There is an apparent double standard in Britain's position to pursue a moratorium at home while its negotiators argue against regulatory protection for those countries unable to secure such voluntary agreements.

  The Sixth Meeting not only failed to agree a protocol, but also failed to agree a further process for negotiations. They agreed only to hold another meeting "as soon as practicable" and no later than the next Conference of the Parties to the Biodiversity Convention (scheduled for May 2000).

  In March, as soon as it became apparent that the negotiations had broken down, the World Development Movement wrote to the Environment Secretary, asking him to play a leading role in re-convening the negotiations, and, if necessary, concluding an agreement without the US. Many WDM members amongst the public have written to support such a leadership role for the government.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

  WDM recommends that the British government gives political priority, at the most senior level of government, to re-convening the Biosafety Protocol negotiations process. The aim of this initiative should be to conclude a strong agreement by September 1999. This would ensure that the issue of GMO trade is dealt with prior to the commencement of substantive discussions on the agenda for the World Trade Organisation Ministerial meeting, scheduled for November 1999.

  We recommend that the Protocol contain the following key points:

(1)  It establishes the explicit right of governments to restrict the import of genetically modified food, animal feed and seeds on the basis of the Precautionary Principle applied to the risk of environmental damage, public health or social disruption, including to the livelihoods of farmers.

(2)  It requires companies producing the GMOs to be legally responsible for the consequences if damage results from use of the GMOs or products derived from them, and to pay full compensation.

  We further recommend that the government pursue these aims on the understanding that it will be prepared to sign such an agreement without the endorsement of the US government.

April 1999