Select Committee on Environmental Audit Written Evidence


APPENDIX 7

Memorandum submitted by the Green Party of England and Wales

1.  REMIT

  1.1  The inquiry gives its overall objective as "to assess the feasibility of emissions trading systems (including Contraction and Convergence) as a framework for negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement. It will examine whether such systems can be enforced and the practical difficulties involved, taking account of what has been learned from the development of the EU ETS and the growth of carbon trading initiatives such as the Chicago Climate Exchange. From this perspective, the Committee will examine the objectives to be pursued by the UK during its presidencies in 2005 of both the G8 and the EU, and the contribution of the various departments involved such as the FCO, DEFRA, HMT, DfT, and DFID."

  1.2  The Committee says it is particularly interested in the following:

    (a)  Whether an international ETS is feasible, given that targets and compliance penalties would need to be rigidly enforced and bearing in mind the political pressures to which an international ETS would be subject.

    (b)  What other alternatives to an international ETS exist; and whether an ETS would be more effective than such alternatives in maximising carbon reductions worldwide and in channelling investment in low-carbon technologies into less developed countries.

    (c)  What approach and specific objectives in relation to climate change the UK Government should adopt during its presidency of the G8 and EU in 2005.

    (d)  What contribution individual departments can make (eg FCO, DEFRA, HMT, DfT, and DFID), and whether they are sufficiently "joined-up" in delivering a coherent UK agenda.

2.  SUMMARY

  2.1  The Kyoto Protocol suffers from some major shortcomings:

    (a)  It is based on old science and its targets are inadequate.

    (b)  It doesn't count aviation-related or trade-related emissions, though these are increasingly significant.

    (c)  It doesn't take account of the problem of "CO2 burden-shifting." That is, a country may appear to have reduced its emissions attributable to manufacture for the domestic market, when in fact the manufacture has merely moved abroad, so the emissions attributable to that country's domestic consumption have not reduced at all.

  2.2  The best system for reducing emissions is the one known as Contraction and Convergence. This is the fairest system and the one most likely to ultimately win universal support. It should be adopted by the UK, the EU and the G8.

  2.3  There are significant issues pertaining to the use of a currency like the dollar for emissions-trading purposes. In an inadequate system, the USA could simply buy the right to emit potentially limitless CO2 by printing more dollars to buy emissions permits. As this could severely undermine emissions trading:

    (a)  There must be a cap on overall emissions, not merely a system of trading.

    (b)  Serious consideration must be given to the issue of which currencies are used for trading, including the possibility of creating a special international currency for this purpose only.

  2.4  In parallel with urgent efforts to achieve international agreements, the UK must make very much stronger efforts to reduce its own emissions. The current problem may be summarised thus:

    (a)  The UK government, and the three dominant political parties, are pursuing targets which are inadequate.

    (b)  None of the above have the policies necessary to meet even their inadequate targets.

    (c)  All of them propose inadequate measures in important policy areas, including inadequate support for road traffic reduction, inadequate measures on energy conservation, and inadequate investment in non-nuclear renewable energy production.

    (d)  All of them continue to pursue some major policies which go in entirely the wrong direction, including aviation growth, road building and support for increasing trade and economic globalisation.

  2.5  This submission does not contain a comprehensive package of policies for tackling climate change. This can be found in the Green Party's Manifesto for a Sustainable Society and other Green Party publications. It does, however, identify some key issues that must be addressed, and indicates a number of concrete proposals which we believe must be taken on board by all UK political parties, and thus by the UK government, and must be actively promoted thereby to the EU, the G8 and indeed all other countries.

  2.6  We look to the Environmental Audit Committee to help push for real progress on this.

  2.7  This submission includes concretes proposals which we believe are essential, and which we hope the Committee which adopt as its own recommendations.

3.  INTRODUCTION

  3.1  The Green Party has been campaigning on the need to address the environmental impact of our economic and social system for the past 35 years. Climate change has always been at the heart of our concerns. We adopted the Contraction and Convergence policy in the mid-1990s and have campaigned for it ever since. We see this submission as a strategic approach to the political problems concerned with ensuring the global adoption of that framework.

  3.2  The arguments over the science have concluded: climate change is now a political problem. The Green Party has viewed this as a political problem for a number of years and has arrived at various conclusions in terms of dealing with the problem.

4.  LIMITATIONS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (1)—OLD SCIENCE

  4.1  The targets set in the Kyoto Protocol are based on old science and are very much short of what is required in terms of CO2 reduction to avert the worst consequences of climate change.

  4.2  In any case, there must be strong recognition that the higher-polluting countries like the UK have a duty to achieve greater reductions.

  4.3  Therefore the government's current commitment to 60% CO2 reductions by 2050 is inadequate. The Green Party believes that more like 90% reductions will be necessary by 2050, and in fact 85% by 2030, and thus 40% by 2020, and thus 40% by 2020 to have a realistic chance of meeting the higher targets later.

  4.4  Proposal: The government, the EU and the G8 must all recognise:

    (a)  That scientists are demanding greater reductions than they were in the 1990s when Kyoto was framed.

    (b)  The countries that have been polluting more for longer have a duty to achieve significantly greater reductions.

5.  LIMITATIONS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (2)—TRADE-RELATED EMISSIONS

  5.5  As a result of sustained corporate lobbying, trade-related CO2 emissions were specifically excluded from Kyoto limits. This is a problem for two reasons:

    (a)  Without their inclusion the targets are practically meaningless. The task in hand is to reduce CO2 to sustainable concentrations; to exempt trade-related CO2 as though it were not CO2 is patently absurd.

    (b)  This problem is compounded because trade-related emissions are growing and are likely to continue growing in the foreseeable future as economic globalisation generates greater freight mileage. It must be observed not merely that globalisation increases the quantities of goods consumed, but also the average distances they travel, as for example various well-known reports on food miles have demonstrated.

  5.6  Clearly these emissions must be counted. Alleged difficulties in ascertaining which country ought to be held responsible (whether the producer, the consumer or the carrier) should not be allowed to delay progress in acknowledging the problem and beginning to address it. We would argue that the most obvious place to count trade-related emissions is the recipient country, because it is the recipient's demand that has stimulated the emissions.

  5.7  Proposal: CO2 produced during the transport of goods from one country to another must be included in the emissions total for the country most clearly responsible for the emissions—namely the country where those goods are consumed.


6.  LIMITATIONS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (3)—AVIATION-RELATED EMISSIONS

  6.1  Aviation is now the fastest-growing source of greenhouse gas emissions. Michael Howard acknowledged this in his September 2004 speech on climate change. Tony Blair in his speech the very next day said that aviation will make up one-quarter of UK emissions by 2030. It is therefore reasonable to expect most MPs to acknowledge that excluding aviation emissions is a very serious shortcoming of the Kyoto Protocol.

  6.2  Again, problems have been asserted regarding who should take responsibility for the emissions—the country of departure, the country where the aircraft took on the fuel, or the country where the aircraft is owned. Again, such arguments should not be allowed to delay acknowledgement of the problem. We would argue that the country which generated the demand—ie where the ticket was purchased—should take responsibility for that ticket's share of the emissions.

  6.3  Proposal:  Aviation emissions must be included in the emissions total of the country most clearly responsible for those emissions—namely the country where the ticket was purchased.

  6.4  The House of Lords this year passed an Air Traffic Emissions Reduction Bill intended to reduce aviation-related CO2 emissions by 50% by 2050. As far as we know, this was the first attempt in any national legislature to seriously address the issue of aviation emissions, and their Lordships are to be congratulated. If the UK government brought this Bill into law, it would set a much-needed example.

  6.5  Proposal:  The UK government should bring into law the Air Traffic Emissions Reduction Bill already approved by the House of Lords, and argue for its equivalent to be adopted by other countries.

7.  LIMITATIONS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (4)—THE PROBLEM OF CO2 BURDEN-SHIFTING

  7.1  The movement of much of our heavy industry and production to poorer countries, especially China, has meant that there has been a process of CO2 burden-shifting: that is, many goods consumed in the UK are no longer produced in the UK, meaning the CO2 emissions associated with their production are now counted in other countries' emissions totals.

  7.2  The problem with CO2 burden-shifting is that it creates the false impression that a high-consuming country is managing to reduce its emissions—when in fact all that has happened is that its consumption has continued unchanged, and thus its emissions have continued, but the responsibility for those emissions has been shifted to another country. Because high consumption is a major driving force in increasing emissions, this very much distorts how we perceive responsibility for emissions and our performance in cutting them.

  7.3  If we are to have a fair exchange system that all economies can support it is important that the CO2 embodied in goods consumed in the UK but manufactured elsewhere should be included in UK emissions totals. Figures from Best Foot Forward suggest that alongside our net per capita emissions of CO2 of 9,029 kg we should add CO2 embodied in net imports of 2,132 kg—a 23.6% increase.

  7.4  Proposal:  There must be a mechanism to prevent CO2 burden-shifting, so that high-consuming countries are required to count emissions related to that consumption as their own.

8.  THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME

  8.1  The EU Emissions Trading Scheme seems to be designed to avoid loopholes and to ensure that emissions reductions really occur. To that extent, the Green Party endorses it. However it allows "grandfathered" rights to emissions and this must be phased out over time in a structured way, in concert with a revised focus of industrial policy.

  8.2  Proposal:  The EU Emissions Trading Scheme should be restructured to enable the phasing out of grandfathering rights and to allow its phasing in with a global trading scheme according to the principles of Contraction and Convergence.

  8.3  A system of taxation needs to be used to constrain the unnecessary movement of goods and mitigate the negative impact on the ecosystem of the production, extraction and transportation of imported goods. Such a system is necessary to ensure that countries which take the need to reduce CO2 emissions seriously are not penalized when trading with others. It also ensures that the CO2 that is produced is used efficiently to increase human well-being.

  8.4  Proposal:  Import duties should be levied on both raw materials and finished products in order to reflect their ecological impact, where sufficient ecotaxes are not considered to have been levied in their country of origin.

9.  SUPPORT FOR CONTRACTION AND CONVERGENCE

  9.1  The Green Party has supported the C&C model for a decade. We believe it is the only just and sustainable approach to the problem of climate change. It must be noted that the UNFCCC secretariat has recently stated that C&C is "inevitable"—so this is not merely one more idea to consider, it is a policy increasingly recognised as the fairest, the concept most likely to be effective, and the concept most likely to gain the support of the largest number of countries.

  9.2  The C&C package is completed with an emissions-trading mechanism, which must include a percentage cap to limit the proportion of a country's reductions that can be bought rather than achieved domestically. Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are also required and should be set up by the UNFCCC.

  9.3  Proposal:  the UK government, the EU and the G8 should all adopt Contraction and Convergence and lobby for its adoption by all governments.

10.  VARIABLE IMPACTS OF C&C

  10.1  The C&C model will entail a transfer of economic resources from the wealthier to the poorer nations. As a rough guide, Table 1 shows how the shares of carbon dioxide emissions of poor countries do not match their shares of world population. The comparison of India and the USA is the most striking. The USA has around 5% of the world's population but produces around 25% of emissions. Conversely, India has around 20% of the world's population but produces around 5% of the CO2 emissions. The different levels of consumption in the two nations and the gross inequalities between them can be directly linked to carbon dioxide emissions and could be solved by an economic transfer from the USA to India.

  10.2  Table 2 indicates the extent to which a range of countries are over-producing CO2 at present.

Table 1

SHARES OF POPULATION AND SHARES OF CARBON DIOXIDE, A SAMPLE OF RICH/POOR COUNTRIES
Country% population Percentage CO2
USA4.7724.4
Sweden0.150.21
UK0.992.39
Malawi0.190.003
Malaysia0.380.55
India17.084.78


  Source:   CO2 emissions data are from Oakridge National Laboratory for 1999; population figures from the UN for 2000.

Table 2

CO2 ENTITLEMENT UNDER A PER CAPITA REGIME AND ACTUAL EMISSIONS, A SAMPLE OF RICH/POOR COUNTRIES (CO2 MEASURED AS MTC)
CountryCO2
entitlement
Actual CO2
emissions in 1999
CO2
per capita
Algeria31.5924.76 0.80
Cameroon15.571.28 0.08
Denmark5.4613.55 2.54
India1050.13293.94 0.29
Senegal9.901.02 0.11
Jamaica17.312.79 0.16
Kuwait2.6313.09 5.10
UK60.99147.20 2.47
USA292.901499.85 5.26


  Note:  There are two possible ways to measure CO2, either as a gas or in terms of the solid carbon. We have used the latter unit because of the neatness of the 6 billion tones and 6 billion people of the C&C model. The ratio between the two units is simply the ratio of their molecular weights, ie 44/12, so that 1 tonne of carbon is equivalent to 3.67 tonnes of CO2.

  Source:   Emissions data from Oakridge National Research Laboratory, USA for 1999; population data from UN for 2000.

Table 3

EXCESS OF ACTUAL CO2 EMISSIONS COMPARED WITH C&C PERMITTED LEVELS AND PERCENTAGE REDUCTION REQUIRED, SAMPLE OF RICH/POOR COUNTRIES
CountryExcess (xfold) % reduction
USA13.092.2
Kuwait13.192.0
Denmark6.983.9
UK6.283.4
Algeria2.449.9
India0.7-42.9
Jamaica0.4-148.4
Senegal0.3287.7
Cameroon0.2-386.3


  Source:   Emissions data from Oakridge National Research Laboratory, USA for 1999; population data from UN for 2000.

  10.3  Table 3 indicates the size of the transfers that will be effected by the C&C model.

  10.4  From a political perspective it is important that all nations have an incentive to sign up for C&C. The primary incentive is that only a system that is ultimately agreed by all can allow all to survive on a viable planetary support system; and a system that is visibly just makes general agreement more likely. However, we must acknowledge that different types of country will face different problems within a limited CO2 framework, and seek to give them all an incentive to join the system.

  10.5  There is a fairly widespread concern that the USA will drag its feet. However:

    (a)  We cannot allow this to prevent us making whatever progress is possible in the meantime.

    (b)  C&C is likely to achieve the most widespread support the soonest, which will put increased pressure on the US government to acknowledge the need for action.

11.  EU TRADE AND EU CARBON TRADE

  11.1  The Green Party is prepared to support the idea of carbon trading within an equitable framework on the understanding that a structured market can be the most efficient way of distributing a scarce resource.

  11.2  However, much of the carbon dioxide that is presently produced is wasted in transporting goods from one market to another. Trade should be reduced so that it returns to being a means of obtaining goods that are not available locally, according to the principle of trade subsidiarity.

  11.3  A CO2 limitation framework inevitably implies that the CO2 that is produced is used most efficiently to promote human well-being. This will require the active involvement of government to manage markets so that well-being rather than profits lies at the heart of economic activity.

  11.4  As a step towards this, governments need to recognize that increases in trade are not always positive developments.

  11.5  Proposal:  The UK government, the EU and the G8 should cease regarding increases in trade as an inherently positive development.

12.  CARBON TRADING AND THE RESERVE CURRENCIES

  12.1  In establishing a carbon trading system, one fundamental question that must not be overlooked is: which currencies will be eligible for purchasing the right to produce CO2? If it is the present reserve currencies this will introduce a political imbalance in favour of countries issuing those currencies, namely: USA, Japan, EU, UK and Switzerland. Countries controlling reserve currencies will be able to support an increased creation of their currencies to purchase more CO2 permits; those without this power will find have to pay effectively higher prices.

  12.2  This imbalance will reduce the political attractiveness of the scheme, and it will also tempt governments to print more currency in times of economic hardship to buy more permits and help out their polluting industries.

  12.3  Proposal:  The Committee should investigate the possibility of creating a new global currency for carbon trading. Such a currency would need to be backed by and administered by the UN.

13.  EXERTING POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON THE USA

  13.1  US policy in the energy field is dominated by oil interests. In the long run this will be to the detriment of the US economy, which will be left behind in the economic world of the 21st century, where low-energy systems and renewable energies will dominate. This argument already appears to have been understood by various sub-national political players and corporations in the US. Negotiations to reduce CO2 emissions are likely to be more effective at this level for the foreseeable future.

  13.2  It is frequently stated that European nations are powerless to exert influence on the USA to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions. We do not believe this to be the case. We would propose the introduction of import duties to reflect the CO2 content embodied in goods imported from the USA. This would remove the unfair competition that would exist between countries that were attempting to meet Kyoto and other CO2 reduction targets and those which were not.

  13.3  Such carbon-balance tariffs could be formally negotiated at the WTO, which is the body charged with ensuring fair international trade. They could also be introduced unilaterally by the EU and her other trading partners, especially former colonies, such as members of the British Commonwealth.

  13.4  Proposal:  The UK and the EU should introduce carbon-balance tariffs to prevent high-polluting countries gaining any unfair advantage in trade.

  13.5  In terms of political pressure, countries from the poorer world may begin to refuse to recycle US foreign debt, in response to both US foreign policy and the risk the USA poses to sustainability by its refusal to reduce CO2 emissions. Foreigners now own 38% of US Treasury securities, which is more than twice the amount a decade ago, and gives them considerable leverage over the US economy. The inherent weakness of the US's position is made clear in the following quotation from a recent article by Janet Bush in New Statesman ("America's Foes Prepare for Monetary Jihad", 4 October 2004):

    One of the curious features of US hegemony is that it depends on the apparently limitless willingness of US allies—and even of some future competitors, such as China—to finance the apparently limitless budget and trade deficits of the US. Over the past 20 years the US has become the world's leading debtor, its net foreign debt rising from $250 billion in 1982 to $2.2 trillion in 2001, 23% of GDP—almost equal to the $2.5 trillion owed by 5 billion people in the whole of the developing world.

  13.6  Japan, China and the newly industrialized countries of East Asia have invested their trade surpluses in US Treasury bonds to underwrite the value of the dollar. If they did not do this the US dollar would fall, making their exports more expensive in the US. They might also face more barriers to trade with the US.

  13.7  However, the US relies on this purchase of Treasury bonds to remain solvent and is thus dependent on the Asian economies. Thus in spite of the apparent omnipotence of the US and its currency the dollar, it is possible for the Asian economies to exercise leverage, and it is vital to bring them on board for any trading system.

  13.8  The EU should focus on increasing the amount of binational trade that is conducted in euros, pounds and other non-dollar currencies and should encourage Asian economies to do the same. Rather than using the value generated through this use of their reserve currencies to fund deficits, EU nations should use it to purchase carbon permits from countries with a CO2 surplus (ie countries which are currently emitting less than their per capita allowance under C&C), thus effectively using it for the benefit of poorer countries.

  13.9  Proposal:  Those countries in the G8 and EU committed to genuine carbon dioxide reductions should negotiate with the Asian and Middle Eastern economies to trade goods and oil for non-dollar currencies, especially the euro and the pound.

14.  UK EMISSIONS TARGETS—LEADING BY EXAMPLE

  14.1  The UK government has continually asserted that it "leads the world" on climate change due to its support for Kyoto. The Green Party believes this is highly misleading propaganda which serves to defuse public concern by sustaining the false impression that the UK is playing the necessary part in tackling climate change.

  14.2  The IPCC, the RCEP and more recently the UK government have accepted the need for global CO2 reductions of 60% by 2050. However, if these global reductions are to be made in an equitable fashion, the higher-polluting countries like the UK must make bigger reductions. This would translate into a UK target more like 90% by 2050 at the very latest, with clear and definite targets at stages along the way.

  14.3  Proposal:  The UK government should immediately adopt a target of 85% CO2 reductions by 2030, including a 50% reduction by 2020, and a comprehensive package of policies to achieve this target.

15.  CONTRIBUTION FROM UK GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

  15.1  It is still commonplace to imagine that environmental protection is some kind of threat to business per se. There is therefore an unhealthy tension between the government departments dealing with environment on one hand and business on the other. The desirable situation is that the entire government acknowledges ecological imperatives and all of them support the requisite action—the most urgent being climate change. Although the term "sustainable development" is now common usage, it is entirely clear that a number of crucial aspects of current economic development are far from sustainable.

Department of Trade and Industry

  15.2  We note that the DTI is not explicitly mentioned as a department with a major responsibility in the area of climate change in the remit for this inquiry. We would suggest that the priority for government action must be focused on this department and the Treasury to implement policies to encourage the development of a low-energy economy.

  15.3  Proposal:  The DTI must be charged with the responsibility for switching the emphasis of business support away from trade-related initiatives and towards the strengthening of local economies.

  15.4  The British government plays an important role in influencing the structure of foreign trade via the payment of Export Credit Guarantees. These export-supporting grants could be used to encourage the transfer of technologies to developing countries that would enable them to gain a head start in creating sustainable economies. We would suggest that the support grants currently paid to arms industries, currently around 30% of the total, which are a destructive influence on poorer countries' economies, should be switched towards industries which would help these countries build sustainable economies.

  15.5  Proposal:  The proportion of Export Credit Guarantees currently paid for the export of arms should be switched with immediate effect towards support for the export of renewable energy technologies.

HM Treasury

  15.6  The Climate Change Levy (CCL) is too complex. Its main problem is that the reduction targets are allowed to be either reductions in absolute energy use or in emissions, or reductions in energy or carbon intensity. Intensity reduction is unsatisfactory as it permits improvement to be swamped by emissions growth induced by economic growth, and the Green Party would remove that option. There are also many complications in trying to focus on carbon emissions rather than energy use, such as exemptions for CHP use. Since industrial response to the CCL seems to be more in terms of actually reducing emissions rather than finding other ways round it, overall the Green Party is cautiously in favour of it—but it is no substitute for a comprehensive package of policies calculated to achieve the above targets.

  15.7  Road fuel duties are important in encouraging drivers to become mileageconscious and to choose more fuel-efficient vehicles. As far as is practical the costs of motoring should rise in line with increased car usage, to make increased car use less attractive and to encourage the use of public transport. Fuel taxes should therefore be increased to incorporate Road Fund Licence (the tax disk).

  15.8  We would also propose, as a short-term measure en route to a full system of ecotaxation, the reintroduction of the fuel tax escalator, which was removed for reasons of political expediency that ignored the requirements for CO2 reductions.

  15.9  Proposal:  The UK government to immediately reintroduce the fuel tax escalator and scrap the tax disc.

  15.10  We would also propose the introduction of a package of aviation taxes. While the US government remains a barrier to amending the Chicago Convention—under which no country may tax aviation fuel—other steps may be taken nonetheless, to begin addressing the problem pending complete international agreement.

    (a)  The Green Party proposes that the EU abandon any Chicago Convention commitments and introduce an EU-wide aviation fuel tax.

    (b)  The Green Party proposes that even before this is agreed, the UK government introduce a package of aviation taxes not strictly related to fuel:

    (1)  An emissions charge based on that in force at Zurich airport, which places higher charges on the more highly-polluting aircraft. This is revenue-neutral but serves to encourage airlines to introduce cleaner technology sooner.

    (2)  An "externalities charge" set at a percentage of a given airport's estimated annual external costs (including the cost of its contribution to climate change—which for UK aviation as a whole is estimated at more than £2 billion a year). Revenue would be ringfenced for investment in alternative infrastructure. (It must be noted that 45% of air trips within the EU are under 500 kilometres, and many could be replaced by rail.) While in the short term providing such revenue, in the longer term it would serve to discourage avoidable air transport.

    (3)  Increased landing charges and "air traffic congestion charges" would provide additional tools for reducing air travel.

  15.11  Proposal:  The UK government should:

    (a)  Immediately introduce a package of charges intended to reduce air transport.

    (b)  Lobby the EU for the introduction as soon as possible of an EU aviation fuel tax.

    (c)  Lobby the G8 and other countries for a comprehensive international agreement on aviation fuel tax.

Department for International Development

  15.12  The DFID should promote C&C to developing countries.

  15.13  Aid payments must be evaluated for their effects on CO2 reductions or increases. In general, there should be no aid payment which would increase emissions, if it were possible to fund an alternative equivalent project which would reduce emissions. Eg there should no aid to help pay for a coal-fired power station, because such a project would lead to greater emissions than an equivalent non-nuclear renewable energy project.

  15.14  The UK, EU and G8 countries, as a short-term measure, must assist sustainable development in poorer countries by transferring, free to the recipient, technology associated with energy conservation and non-nuclear renewable energy production. As climate change poses a major threat not merely to developing countries but to rich countries as well, this should be seen not merely as aid but as an investment in the donor country's own protection against the economic impacts of climate change.

  15.15  Proposals:

    (a)  The DFID should promote C&C to developing countries.

    (b)  Aid payments must be evaluated for their effects (and potential effects) on emissions.

    (c)  The UK, EU and G8 must invest in the free transfer of emissions reduction technology to poorer countries, to help set them on the road to low-emissions development.

The Department for Transport

  15.16  The DfT is quite simply a major offender in terms of climate change and is decades behind the leading thinking on sustainable transport. This subject deserves a major paper in its own right. However, two issues are especially pressing: roadbuilding and aviation.

  15.17  The national roadbuilding programme is set to spend £30 billion over 10 years in building and widening roads. It is very well established that providing more road space generates more traffic. Despite repeated promises of traffic reduction before it came to power in 1997, Labour's first transport white paper abandoned the idea of traffic reduction. Instead we have been promised 17% traffic growth during the term of the 10-year plan. As road transport directly contributes at least 20% of CO2 emissions, this is entirely unacceptable. The government must cancel the roadbuilding programme and invest in a proper package of emissions-reducing transport measures. These measures must be tailored to achieving CO reductions from road transport commensurate with its contribution to the overall targets (including 85% by 2030). We are confident that, as a first step, suitable measures could be undertaken to achieve a 20% traffic reduction within 10 years.

  15.18  Proposal:  The national roadbuilding programme must be scrapped, and the resulting £30 billion saving invested in a package of emissions-reducing policies including 20% traffic reduction within 10 years.

  15.19  For the longer term, there must be a significant reduction in the routine transportation of people and goods. This will be achieved partly by economic policies aimed at challenging globalisation, and partly through specific policies aimed at economic localisation, ranging from the maintenance of local abattoirs and the provision of local shopping facilities, to the production of goods relatively locally for local need wherever practicable.

  15.20  To help reduce routine transportation, the planning system must be geared to:

    (a)  Reorienting work patterns to reverse the current trend by which people are accustomed to travelling further to work than they used to.

    (b)  Reorienting the pattern of planning decisions so that they contribute to a progressive reduction in per capita passenger kilometres and freight kilometres.

  15.21  Proposal:  The DfT in close cooperation with other departments must develop and implement policies for a significant reduction in the routine transportation of people and goods.

  15.22  In terms of aviation, the UK should simply not be encouraging growth, but should be actively engaged in assessing how much air transport is feasible in a world threatened by climate change.

  15.23  We note that:

    (a)  All developments in engine technology which bring about reduced emissions per passenger kilometre are easily outstripped by the rate of growth of the industry.

    (b)  Whereas various alternative fuels are proposed for road transport, there is no credible evidence in the public domain that technology will be capable of reducing aviation's contribution to climate change in a manner that would allow for anything like the currently predicted growth.

  15.24  Proposal:  The DfT should support the measures referred to above relating to aviation.

23 November 2004





 
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