Memorandum submitted by Leeds City Council
(FL 103)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Flood risk management in the UK is currently
regulated by a series of different statutes and a large body of
Common Law. Roles are split between several bodies—including
the Environment Agency, water companies, local authorities, highway
authorities and riparian owners. As a consequence coordination
of effort is problematic and there are many areas of flood risk
management for which no-one has an effective responsibility. These
include flooding from overland flow, hazards from reservoirs falling
outside the regulatory regime of the Reservoirs Act 1975, preparation
of off-site emergency plans for reservoirs, and the adoption of
sustainable drainage installations.
Design standards for the hydraulic capacity
of sewers and watercourses appear to be completely different and
require re-appraisal: flood risk victims do not think that flooding
from sewers is acceptable at a higher frequency than that from
watercourses.
The June 2007 flooding in Leeds disabled, or
put at severe risk, critical infrastructure such as the railway
station and a major electricity sub-station. This has happened
on several occasions in the last five years. Thus, the detrimental
effect of the flooding extended unnecessarily far beyond the occupants
of the buildings that were inundated. The resilience of critical
national infrastructure to flood events needs to be investigated.
Improved collaboration between relevant organisations
(local authorities, the environment agency, and water companies)—reinforced
by statutory obligations—is needed in drawing up flood risk
management plans, preparation of Strategic Flood Risk Assessments,
investigating flood incidents, sharing information about flood
incident locations, and the sharing of drainage infrastructure
records.
Some clarification of the roles of key organisations
during a flood incident is needed.
OUTLINE SUGGESTIONS
FOR INQUIRIES
INTO JUNE
2007 FLOODING
Recommendation
Need for a new, single national statutory framework
(and appropriate statutory guidance) which clearly defines the
roles and responsibilities of all key players in the management
of the drainage infrastructure and flood risk and which requires
their participation in joint solutions.
Statement of Problem and Detailed Comment
1.1 The current statutory framework is fragmentary,
composed of a disparate set of laws which lack clarity of responsibility,
have significant gaps or are difficult to enforce. The responsibilities
of riparian owners emanate from common law and can be difficult
to enforce. Amongst the key statutes are the:
— Water Industry Act 1991
— Water Resources Act 1991
EA SUPERVISORY ROLE
2.1 The Water Resources Act, 1991 (s.105)
says that the EA "shall . . . exercise a general supervision
over all matters relating to flood defence". The EA needs
to strengthen its role in this area. Currently, it seems to be
concentrating only on "main river" flood risk. Only
rarely does the EA engage water companies in discussing flooding
problems on a strategic level. The EA has done little to act as
a catalyst for discussion and collaboration between the relatively
isolated drainage engineers working for local authorities (this
being especially necessary since sewerage agencies were abolished).
DAM AND
RESERVOIR SAFETY
Inadequacy of Water Act Framework
3.1 The contingency planning requirements
included in the Water Act were inadequately framed in spite of
advice provided to DEFRA officials by LGA advisers and other emergency
planning representatives who were asked to provide an input into
the provisions. In particular, whilst there is a statutory requirement
for there to be an on-site plan developed by the undertaker and
links developed with emergency responders, there is no requirement
for there to be an off-site plan in line with well-established
models in place for industrial accidents under the COMAH regulations.
There is no compunction for such work to be undertaken other than
through its being picked-up via the Civil Contingencies Act risk
assessment process. However, in a number of specific areas, this
would constitute an enormous burden within existing resources
and, if done correctly, would prevent any other emergency planning
work being undertaken. In addition to this, no lead agency has
been identified for who should undertake this work nor any recharge
mechanism for compensating public agencies for mitigating risks
related to structures owned by private entities.
3.2 In relation to structures falling under
the Reservoirs Act threshold of 25,000 cu. m, only 40% of these
relate to water company-owned reservoirs. A large number of the
majority remaining are owned by charities or other organisations,
many of which are not financially resourced to undertake on-site
planning nor to undertake the responsibility of co-ordinating
an on-site response.
Appropriateness of Current Reservoirs Act Threshold
3.3 A significant number of reservoirs exist,
which are below the capacity (25,000 cu.m) required for registration
as a large raised reservoir under the 1975 Act, but which are
nevertheless believed by the EA and local authorities to constitute
a potential flood risk to communities. Many of these are disused
mill ponds in the Pennine area (Lancashire, Yorkshire and Derbyshire)
which are no longer maintained for their original function and
are in a poor condition. Some are on hillsides overlooking populated
areas and, because of the lack of maintenance and superintendence,
are arguably a greater hazard than many larger reservoirs. Consideration
should be given to including these within an enforcement regime,
or at the very least issuing safety guidelines to their undertakers.
Scope of Coverage of Reservoirs Act
3.4 A number of reservoirs are designed
with the intention of storing considerably less than 25,000 cu.m.,
but are quite clearly capable of storing a vast amount more. There
seems to be confusion amongst panel engineers about the definition
of the relevant capacity. Some even say that a normally empty
balancing reservoir should be considered as having zero capacity
for the purposes of the Act. This quite clearly ignores the whole
point of the Act, which is to ensure that potential hazards are
properly supervised. The Enforcement Authority (the EA) should
review the interpretation of the Act.
3.5 There are also a number of quarry lagoons
which constitute de facto reservoirs, but which are regulated
by the HSE under a less rigorous regime contained within the Mines
and Quarries Act. Once these are decommissioned, we understand
these are unregulated or insufficiently regulated. At least some
water companies also have large non-water storage reservoirs for
sludge etc which have capacities over the Reservoirs Act threshold,
but which are also not regulated and may give rise to major risks.
The nature of this risk would suggest that these bodies of water
should be subject to the same rigour as actual reservoirs.
RUN-OFF
FROM OPEN
LAND ("LAND
DRAINAGE FLOWS")
4.1 Many properties in Leeds were flooded
in June 2007 by water running off fields and open space. No one,
however, currently has any responsibility or duty to resolve flooding
that arises from surface water run-off from fields or open space.
4.2 The Water Industry Act, 1991 (s.94)
says: "It shall be the duty of every sewerage undertaker
[ie water company] . . . to provide, improve and extend such a
system of public sewers (whether inside its area or elsewhere)
and so to cleanse and maintain those sewers as to ensure that
that area is and continues to be effectually drained" . .
. and yet the water companies refuse to see it as their responsibility
when houses are knee-deep in water that has run off fields and
highways! The reason they give is that the legislation only empowers
them to provide sewers and "sewers" are elsewhere defined
as drains serving "premises" (not open land). In many
parts of Leeds—in common with other urban areas—there
are no natural watercourses. Consequently, if the overland flows
cannot soak away (due to clayey soil) and cannot go into the sewers,
there is no solution that anyone has a duty to implement. Section
94, which originally was a duty on local authorities in the Public
Health Act, 1936, has thus been rendered meaningless.
4.3 The Councils and the EA have permissive
powers to carry out flood alleviation works on "ordinary
watercourses" and "main rivers" respectively, but
no duty. It is vital that the "duty to effectually drain"
the area should be made enforceable—even if it is lifted
out of the Water Industry Act and given to the EA. Otherwise,
there is no point in calling for greater cooperation between the
various agencies to resolve flooding problems.
CONNECTIVITY OF
OTHER DRAINAGE
INFRASTRUCTURE
5.1 The Water Resources Act s.106 requires
a water companies to accept flows from domestic properties to
its drainage network once planning permission has been granted,
but it does have the ability to refuse the connection of highways
drains to this on "reasonable grounds", leaving this
water with nowhere to drain.
DESIGN STANDARDS
AND POLICY
6.1 The water companies and developers building
prospectively adoptable sewers commonly design sewers to accommodate
flows arising from the worst case 1 in 30 year rainfall without
flooding. This is in accordance with the current edition of the
Sewers for Adoption guidance manual issued by Water UK.
The water companies during June 2007 seemed to quickly seize on
this figure to disclaim responsibility for addressing sewer capacity
issues when people were affected by what seemed like an extraordinary
rainfall. In doing so, they were often making technically erroneous
assumptions, since what is perhaps a record one day rainfall is
not necessarily more severe than the 1 in 30 year sewer design
flow, which should be based on a much shorter rainfall duration.
6.2 When flood alleviation schemes are being
designed by flood defence operating authorities (eg the EA and
local authorities) to control flooding from watercourses, a much
higher standard is used—e.g. a 1 in 100 year flood, or worse,
including an uplift for climate change. This discrepancy between
the standards used for sewers and watercourses does not seem reasonable.
6.3 The rainfall in June 2007 has also brought
into question the reliability of nationally accepted methods for
calculating return periods. In central Leeds, in the 21 days up
to 2 July 2007, 250mm of rain fell. This is one third of the average
annual total and, according to the national Flood Estimate
Handbook, is only likely to occur, on average, once every
1000 years (ie 0.1% AEP). Few people who have experienced the
exceptional rainfall of the last few years, however, would stake
much on this being true!. It is perhaps time that there was a
review of these methods of calculation. If return periods are
over-estimated this not only makes the public cynical, but also
reduces the estimates of future flood damage that are used in
scheme appraisal (cost-benefit ratios, etc).
6.4 Government should also undertake research
and provide guidance in a number of other drainage-related areas:
— What is the impact of permitted development
that increases hard standings and paved areas ? Should such development
be subject to formal planning approvals and should permeable solutions
be mandatory ?
— Do "beanie blocks" make
a positive or negative contribution to highway drainage ?
— What criteria should be used for
determining the cleaning frequency of various forms of highway
drainage ? Should there be recommended standards for main routes,
urban vs rural etc ?
— What prevention strategies can be
adopted for limiting the entry of waste such as cooking fats into
the sewer systems ?
CRITICAL NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
7.1 We were disappointed that in spite of
the 2000 floods and the preparations for Y2K nationally that the
issue of the CNI has not been bottomed. Government needs to urgently
ensure that electricity substations and fresh water pumping stations
and their ilk are adequately protected. In addition, there should
be nationally agreed resources to deal with business continuity
issues arising from failures in these areas, in terms of back-up
power supplies, national water contracts for bowsers and bottled
supplies, very high-volume pumps etc.
STRATEGIC FLOOD
RISK ASSESSMENTS
8.1 We are led to believe that the SFRAs—key
planks in driving our approaches to development and flood risk—now
being produced for local authorities by consultants in compliance
with PPS25 are of divergent qualities and of limited utility.
DEFRA and EA should ensure that robust standards are in place
for these and that rigorous quality control should be in place.
Steps should be taken to ensure that all parties with statutory
role in drainage provision buy in to the SFRA process by supplying
flood risk information in relation to their own drainage assets.
SUDS
9.1 Whilst sustainable urban drainage solutions
are being encouraged for new developments, there is a sense in
which we might be storing up further flood risk problems with
these. The causes for this are that once developers build these
they do not wish to maintain these and water companies do not
want to adopt these. Local authorities are then looked to in order
to intervene and pick-up the responsibility, even though these
costs would have been avoided if conventional gully and piped
drainage had been installed. It is recommended that government
takes a fresh look at the effectiveness of, and responsibility
for, SUDS and how these should be better regulated or taken account
of.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN
DIFFERENT CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTAL
PRIORITIES AND
STATUTORY GUIDANCE
10.1 Central government needs to reconcile
the imperatives of different departmental agendas to ensure these
do not conflict. It is already clear that there are huge tensions
between growing pressures from DCLG to build ever-greater numbers
of housing in urban areas many of which may be brownfield sites
located in flood risk areas and the pressure from DEFRA and the
EA to restrict growth in flood plains under planning guidance
(PPS25). This tension is particularly acute given the lack of
adequate investment in flood defence schemes.
10.2 We also understand that the EA in considering
flood defence measures is legally only allowed to assess the economic
benefits on the basis of buildings already in place and not developments
forming part of the spatial planning in the Local Development
Plan. This is clearly short-sighted and limits the utility of
its methodology.
LOCAL DISTRICT
DRAINAGE STRATEGIES,
FUNDING AND
CO-ORDINATION
FORUMS
11.1 To support a revised national framework,
there should be a statutory duty for all key stakeholder organisations
to cooperate in the development of a local authority district-based
five to ten year "Drainage and Flood Risk Strategic Plan"
highlighting priorities around the existing infrastructure and
how this should evolve. In order to ensure the success of this,
it would be helpful if local authority district based forums comprised
of representatives of the council, EA and water company are set-up
on a statutory basis at a senior management level (to drive the
strategy) and at a technical-operational level (to address known
problems, investigate incidents, and review plans for major developments
on a multi-agency basis). Both of these have been set-up in Leeds
with the aim of driving a more co-ordinated approach in which
local priorities can be better aligned or at least not conflict.
11.2 It is essential that these strategies
are directly linked to an investment plan to fund this. Bodies
like OFWAT should also be required to factor these into discussions
around water company spending plans. Having such a strategy in
place should also prevent drainage from remaining the "Cinderella
service" that it currently is, underfunded and largely ignored.
11.3 Central government should also consider
whether there are sufficient young people being brought into the
profession to ensure that technical expertise and detailed local
knowledge is not lost.
STATUTORY DUTY
TO MAINTAIN
RECORDS OF
THE DRAINAGE
INFRASTRUCTURE
12.1 The effective maintenance and upkeep
of the drainage infrastructure requires responsible bodies to
maintain adequate records in order to highlight where this is,
what size it is, what risks it faces, what cleaning and maintenance
frequencies are required, and the interdependencies and links
to other parts of the infrastructure. Assessments can then be
made about how they should be maintained, by whom and what capital
investments are required.
12.2 Several years ago, Leeds CC was in
the position where it maintained substantial records of culverted
watercourses (although it has no statutory duty to collect or
maintain these), but had few records of private sewers or highway
drains like many authorities. In our view, this contributed to
a less than adequate maintenance regime: "out of sight, out
of mind". Following previous major floods, the Council took
the view that we needed a comprehensive baseline for our maintenance,
investment and risk assessment work and began to survey all aspects
of the Council-owned infrastructure. As a result of this, we have
identified 48,000 of our 130,000 highway gullies using GPS for
upload into a database and GIS and have established that over
5,000 of these require more intensive maintenance as "wetspots".
We also established that, in spite of the current standard eight
monthly cleaning regime, some 7% of gullies are blocked requiring
reactive action.
12.3 In our view, the proposed transfer
of private sewers to water companies will result in most of them
being recorded in the near future. We would also suggest that
all watercourses and ponds of a significant size in a district
should be identified by the local authority and information maintained
on the ownership of these for enforcement purposes. Solicitors
should also be required to draw attention to these "assets"
as part of the conveyancing process so that owners understand
the nature of the burden they are taking on.
STATUTORY DUTY
TO SHARE
INFORMATION ON
INFRASTRUCTURE AND
COOPERATE IN
INVESTIGATIONS
13.1 In flooding incidents, the flood waters
may arise from multiple sources—sewers, highway drains,
watercourses, overland run-off, etc—and it is essential
that the different bodies with responsibilities for the relevant
assets collaborate in the investigation of the causes to resolve
problems successfully, but also to avoid "buck passing"
allegations. However, investigations require comprehensive records
and obtaining whatever information there is can be problematic.
13.2 To assist in investigating flooding
or appraising the flood risk from new developments, the Council
has been provided with access to Yorkshire Water sewer records
but only on a stand-alone YWS PC. However, for our purposes it
would be far more useful to be provided with a copy of these in
GIS format in order to superimpose them on our own drainage data.
This would enable us to more easily understand the route of surface
water run-off and to trace this, but is not currently permited.
An example of the complex route taken by run-off might be: Highway
run-off enters a highway gully; this discharges via a connecting
pipe into a highway drain; this in turn connects into a surface
water sewer; this then connects into a culverted watercourse;
this discharges into an open channel watercourse more than a kilometre
away from the original gully. As can be imagined, it is very difficult
to investigate drainage problems holistically when the various
records of each undertaker or owner can only be seen in isolation.
Consideration ought to be given to amending the law so that anyone
who has a statutory duty to keep drainage records also has a duty
to share such records with partner organisations in a compatible
GIS format.
13.3 In another regard, when investigating
recent flooding from culverted watercourses the Council has found
that certain utilities have laid service pipes and cables through
the middle of culverts that are in riparian ownership (whose owners
probably didn't even know of the existence of the culvert).
Recommendation
Need for central government leadership and funding
for the development of policies and tools to support the response
to flooding incidents by Cat 1 and 2 agencies.
14.1 There is a great deal of good practice
available in terms of approaches to responding to flood incidents,
but there should be more national leadership, coordination and
financial support to ensure that this is or can be adopted throughout
the country.
PROVISION OF
A SINGLE,
PROPERLY-RESOURCED
NATIONAL FLOODLINE
NUMBER FOR
MAJOR FLOOD
EMERGENCIES
15.1 We have established from our long and
frequent experience of serious flooding that the victims of flooding
experience great frustration in establishing the source of their
flooding to identify who to call and then trying to get through
to a relevant organisation able or prepared to help. The following
are just some of the numbers they try: local authority general
helpline; specific Council departments, such as drainage, highways,
etc; the water company; the EA; the Fire Service; or even the
Police. Given the difficulty of establishing the cause even for
technical staff, it comes as no surprise that the public often
get referred on elsewhere in a serial "buck passing"
exercise. Serious consideration should be given to piloting a
single flood helpline for all forms of flooding which removes
the barriers and provides clarity for the public who only want
to get help.
SIGN-UP
TO EA FLOOD
WARNING SYSTEMS
16.1 In spite of excellent work over the
years by the EA to promote its warning systems and repeated flooding
in many areas, many householders fail to sign-up to its flood
warning systems. One of the consequences of this is that the scale
of damage caused can be higher due to a failure to take appropriate
precautions in time. Data protection law has been used as a fig
leaf for this failure, but the public authorities are still obliged
to support residents who fail to help themselves.
16.2 The CCS should explore the possibility
of all affected householders in flood warning areas being automatically
opted into the EA's systems with the provisions for them to "opt
out" should they wish. This would save the EA a great deal
of time and effort wasted in promotion, make the schemes more
viable and reduce the level of damage incurred allowing a speedier
recovery.
SINGLE NATIONAL
FLOODING LEAFLET
AND ONE-STOP
FLOOD RECOVERY
WEBSITE
17.1 Currently there are a large number
of leaflets in circulation to provide information to householders
and businesses who have been flooded which cover a range of issues.
These include: general who does what (LAs); insurance (ABI); rogue
builders (Trading Standards); crisis loans (DWP); public health
and clean-up (CIEH); as well as other leaflets provided by the
EA or water companies. As it stands, we have a large number of
organisations reinventing the wheel, preparing leaflets of differing
quality and then bombarding residents with a variety of data,
when the information needed varies little across the country.
17.2 We would recommend that the CCS leads
a short exercise with DEFRA to identify best practice and lead
the preparation of a best practice template encompassing all key
messages which can be adopted in all local areas and which enables
local contact numbers to be inserted.
17.3 This initiative could be coupled with
a national one-stop shop website of helpful information.
NATIONAL CONCEPT
OF OPERATIONS
18.1 In some areas, some agencies have yet
to accept that they have a key role in responding to flooding
emergencies. Following the failure of West Yorkshire Police to
play a meaningful role in previous floods, Leeds CC led the development
of a CONOPS document stating the roles of each agency more clearly.
Even though this has been exercised successfully, in the recent
floods WYP organised its tactical co-ordination on a county rather
than district basis, even though 4 of the five districts were
struggling with co-ordination in their own patches and the County
HQ could not be reached.
18.2 At the same time, Yorkshire Water appears
to have focused exclusively on responding to the challenges to
its own infrastructure rather than participating in a response
characterised by partnership. The EA local areas were overwhelmed
and were unable to provide the fullest support to LAs on those
"main rivers" which were formerly critical ordinary
watercourses, which in Leeds posed the major area of problems.
18.3 National representative bodies (LGA,
ACPO, CFOA, Water UK) should be brought together with the EA by
CCS and DEFRA to agree a national protocol on roles and responsibilities
in flood incident response to avoid confusion. The CCS should
urgently consider the status of water companies in responding
to flooding as their Category 2 status has provided a pretext
for a lesser role.
CLARITY AROUND
WHO SHOULD
PUMP-OUT
DOMESTIC PROPERTIES
19.1 When flood waters are receding, one
of the key goals of residents is to ensure that remaining water
is pumped away as quickly as possible to enable the process of
drying and restoration to begin. Some insurance companies provide
pumping out as a standard service, whilst others refuse. Leeds
would like to contribute in this area, albeit on a prioritised
basis. Our Fire Service are prepared to offer this, but only if
a £100 fee is paid. What service should the public expect
and should this merely be down to local determination or the generosity
of particular insurance companies ?
PLUVIAL FLOODING
RESPONSIBILITIES AND
FLOOD WARNING
TECHNOLOGIES
20.1 The recent off-river flooding served
to highlight the lack of clear responsibility for providing warnings
and co-ordination of pluvial flooding-related incidents. This
is something that requires meaningful discussion between key agencies
at the national level.
20.2 On a more practical level and given
existing limitations, one of the biggest problems faced during
the response to flooding in June 2007 was ensuring that the Council's
limited resources were being used pre-emptively in the right areas.
Given our lack of accurate data, it would have been extremely
useful for the Council to have had access to real-time spatial
rainfall data in the shape of the Met Office's rainfall radar
data (Nimrod). We are aware that the Environment Agency has access
to this in its "HiRad" system, but local authorities
generally do not have access and the cost of this is quite prohibitive.
Given that this data is being collected by a quasi-governmental
organisation, consideration should be given to making it available
to the whole of the flood defence community (including local authority
emergency planners and drainage engineers) free of charge.
NATIONAL PROTOCOL
FOR INFORMATION-SHARING
ON FLOODED
LOCATIONS
21.1 An effective response in support of
the community's needs is wholly dependent on having good intelligence
on locations flooded and to what extent at the earliest possible
moment, regardless of the source. In the recent floods, this proved
tortuous at times, because no single agency maintains a single
repository of this or is necessarily concerned about flooding
from sources for which it has no responsibility. In the absence
of a single helpline, rainfall radar in the local authority and
a single or linked GIS database for logging all properties, the
response can be ad hoc or await identification of affected properties
some days or weeks later in large urban districts where residents
have self-evacuated. Access provided by Cunningham Lindsey (25%
of the market) to the address details of claims for flood damage
in Leeds yielded a significant increase in data around affected
properties and enabled the authority to visit newly-identified
affected areas to offer support.
21.2 However, there are several ways in
which this situation might be rectified:
— Research to be undertaken by the
EA with key partners (LAs, CFOA, Water UK) to explore how a secure
web-based flood incident logging application might be developed
in order for agencies to pool information on flood locations and
type of flooding to ensure that affected residents get the response
needed;
— CCS/DEFRA to explore a protocol with
the Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters to provide a process
of early access to address and post code details of affected properties
to enhance the quality and speed of multi-agency recovery operations
in areas suffering flooding in multiple areas.
Prepared by:
Richard Davies, Head of Risk and Emergency Planning,
Leeds City Council (Chair of Council's Water Asset Management
Working Group), Audit & Risk Division, Civic Hall, Leeds LS1
1UR
David Sellers, Principal Engineer (Land Drainage),
Land Drainage Section, Leeds City Council, City Development Department,
Leonardo Building, Leeds, LS2 8HD
Leeds City Council
September 2007
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