1.  The £29 million spent on the Bicester accommodation project did not deliver any benefit to the taxpayer or advance the development of asylum policy. From the outset, the benefits forecast for the project never outweighed the expected costs. The Department signed the main contract before obtaining detailed planning permission, and should have managed its consultants more effectively. It planned and granted the contract without considering the need for an exit strategy. The Home Office did not seek to gain the confidence of the local community even though it was aware of the strength of feeling locally.

2.  The business case for the Bicester Centre did not recognise explicitly the inherent risk of planning delay, nor the changes to the asylum system and external events, on the potential cost and delivery of the project. The business cases for innovative or controversial projects should be explicit about the risks facing the project and how they are to be managed. They should also be based on realistic assumptions about likely costs and realisable benefits, and include ongoing consideration of whether the proposal continues to offer value for money. If the value for money of a project relies on unquantifiable benefits, this should be made clear to the Accounting Officer, together with the financial implications of cancelling the project at key stages in its development.

3.  In planning this innovative project, the cost benefit analyses were not subjected to close and ongoing scrutiny by the Home Office's Group Investment Board to assess whether the nature and timing of the anticipated benefits were realistic. Such scrutiny was particularly important given there were other policy developments in hand which impacted upon the need for the scheme. The Home Office should have assigned responsibility for co-ordination of asylum policy at a sufficiently senior level to avoid 'silo working'.

4.  Not all of the benefits included in the Bicester cost benefit analysis were true savings or "cashable", increasing the likelihood that the net cost would be greater than the £39 million forecast in the business case. The Home Office should have followed the Treasury's Green Book on investment appraisal which sets out detailed guidance for the economic assessment of the social costs and benefits of all new policies, projects and programmes. The Green Book, which all Department should follow, recommends that all spending proposals should be accompanied by a proportionate and well structured business case.

5.  More than £6 million was spent on consultants but the Home Office could not demonstrate that they had added value in helping the Department mitigate risks to delivery of the project. The Home Office should review its procedures on the appointment and use of consultants and, in particular, should take heed of this Committee's 31^st Report of Session 2006-07, Central government's use of consultants.

6.  The Home Office and the Border and Immigration Agency failed to develop effective contact with the local community and other interested parties, including local MPs. When compiling the business case for an innovative or sensitive project, the Department should consult with interest groups and other stakeholders and reflect their views in the business case.

7.  The Home Office did not have a strategy for dealing with strong public opposition to controversial projects. When seeking planning permission for controversial projects, the Home Office and the Borders and Immigration Agency should model costs under a wider range of scenarios and learn from the experiences of colleagues planning the location of new probation and drug treatment hostels.

8.  Some 30 months after the cancellation of the Bicester Centre, the Home Office has yet to inform the local community of its future intentions for the site. The Home Office should come to a decision on the future use of the Bicester site to end the uncertainty for local people.