2 Lessons to be learned from the scheme
11. The Department underestimated the challenges
of providing redress for hardship suffered in a complex industry
20 years ago. It assumed incorrectly that the scheme would be
routine to administer because it had operated (through the Redundancy
Payments Service) the earlier ex gratia scheme for former
distant water trawlermen without any significant difficulties.
But payments in that scheme had been linked to length of service
with individual employers, which was relatively straightforward
to verify since the Department had access to records of time spent
with each employer. The scheme announced in July 2000 sought to
link payments to time spent working in Icelandic waters, where
evidence was far harder to obtain.[15]
12. The Department acknowledged that it had not understood
the nature of the industry before it began designing the scheme
rules and planning for implementation of the scheme. It held just
one meeting with representatives of former trawlermen on the scheme's
rules between announcing the scheme and opening it to claims,
and did not consult with industry experts or any other potential
sources of information before the scheme opened. Much of the information
that the Department relied upon in arriving at the scheme's rules,
for example the initial list of qualifying vessels, had been provided
by representatives from the Hull Branch of the British Fishermen's
Association, but the Department did not take steps to verify this
information until too late. While these representatives were knowledgeable,
they did not speak for the industry as a whole, and could not
have been expected to.[16]
13. Trawlermen had waited over 20 years for compensation
and the Department was under pressure to get the scheme operating
quickly. Departmental officials had worked on options for a scheme
from May 1998, but did not begin detailed consideration of how
the scheme would be administered until July 2000, the month the
scheme was announced. Officials responsible for policy did not
involve those who would be responsible for administering the scheme
until one month before the scheme announcement. The Department
suggested officials needed to make clear to senior management
and Ministers the practical implications for delivery of policy
objectives if tight deadlines were involved.[17]
14. Although this scheme differed from the Coal Health
Compensation Schemes recently examined by this Committee, the
Department acknowledged that there were parallels in the problems
encountered. Both cases were complex, and it had not stood back
sufficiently, consulted properly, or conducted proper risk and
project planning. The skills and experience of the people responsible
for designing and running these projects was the key to their
success. The Department, in keeping with efforts in other parts
of the Civil Service, was trying to make sure new graduate entrants
were given operational experience early on in their careers. The
current Professional Skills for Government programme, a training
and development programme supported by the Cabinet Secretary,
is intended to help broaden the experience of officials and inculcate
programme and project management skills.[18]
15 Qq 5, 64 Back
16
Qq 14, 15, 19, 23, 53, 54 Back
17
Q 3; C&AG's Report, paras 3.4, 3.5 Back
18
Qq 4, 47-50 Back
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